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ACCESS TO CABLE TELEVISION
Michael Boteint
Ever since cable television1 (CATV) first began to attract a significant number of subscribers,2 the Federal Communications Commission
has been preoccupied with cable's least novel but most politically important capability: importation of distant signals.3 The Commission has
adopted a series of artificial tactics to delay cable's growth. In 1966 it
promulgated rules barring cable television systems from importing
distant signals unless authorized after a lengthy evidentiary hearing; 4
"tFord Urban Law Fellow, 1971-72, Columbia University; Assistant Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1969, Cornell University.
1 Cable television is also known as community antenna television (CATV)-a name
which indicates its origin as a means of providing television signals to areas that could
not receive over the air television broadcasts. A cable television system has four main
components. (1) Television signals are received by an antenna or a microwave relay
system, or are originated at some local point. (2) The signals are relayed to a "headend," where they are amplified and sometimes changed in frequency. (3) They are then sent
out over trunk and feeder lines to different areas of the community. (4) Finally, drop lines
carry the signals from the trunk or feeder lines into each subscriber's home. For a
simple but accurate description of the process, see Knox, Cable Television, ScIENTMc AM.,
Oct. 1971, at 22.
2 In 1963, roughly 1,000 cable television systems had a total of 950,000 subscribers. As
of 1970 there were 2,799 cable systems with 4.4 million subscribers. 1971 BROADCASTING
YEARBOOK 14 (1971).
8 A distant signal is the signal of a television station which does not normally reach
the CATV's community. Under the FCC's new cable rules (Fourth Report and Order, 37
Fed. Reg. 3251 (1972)), there are a number of alternative tests for determining whether a
signal is local or distant, depending on the size of the market. Id. at 3284-85. A television
station's signal is measured by three main standards of increasing coverage and decreasing
signal quality: (1) principal community contour, (2) Grade A contour, (3) Grade B contour. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.683(a)-.685(a) (1971). Each contour varies in relation to the transmitting station's power, frequency, antenna height, and so forth.
4 Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1971) put the
burden on a cable television system to show that importation of distant signals into the
100 largest television markets would "be consistent with the public interest, and specifically
the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area."
Though the rule was by its terms applicable only to the major markets, a combination of
two other rules resulted in the imposition of a virtually identical requirement for markets
below the top 100. Under id. § 74.1105, a cable system was required to give notice to local
television stations before importing distant signals; if a petition opposing the planned
importation was filed (id. § 74.1109) within 30 days of the notice, the system was not
allowed to begin the service until the Commission had instituted proceedings and
rendered a decision. As a practical matter, a petition quickly followed the filing of a
notice. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.2d 309, 339 (1967) (dissenting
opinion). The Supreme Court refused to review a decision upholding the validity of the
automatic stay provision. Bucks County Cable TV, Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 438
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
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only one of these hearings was ever actually completed.5 When this approach began to look like footdragging, the Commission in 1968 initiated, by way of proposed and "interim" regulations, 6 a requirement
that cable systems obtain unobtainable "retransmission consent" of stations broadcasting distant signals. 7 When this in turn started to resemble poaching on congressional copyright territory, 8 the Commision in
1970 effectively abandoned it by proposing as an "alternative" the "public dividend plan," under which cable systems would pay five percent
of their subscription revenues to public television and substitute local
stations' commercials on distant signals. 9 Less than a year later, however,
the Commission changed its signals once again and apparently dropped
both the retransmission consent and public dividend plans. Having
helped force a deal between cable and broadcasting interests, 10 it has
now allocated distant signal importation according to market size, subject to very stringent "exclusivity rights."'1
5 Midwest Television, Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 478 (1968).

6 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C2d 417 (1968). The
Commission stated that pending the conclusion of the proposed rule making, it would
suspend proceedings under the 1966 rules and would process only applications consistent
with the proposed rules. The decision provoked internal Commission dissension and was
alleged to have violated the publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53 (1970)). CATV Interim Processing Procedures, 16 P & F RADIO
REG. 2D 1517, 1530 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
7 Under the retransmission consent plan, to carry distant signals a cable system would
have needed the permission of the stations broadcasting them. Even if stations were indined to grant such permission, they were usually not contractually free to do so. See
Botein, The FCC's Proposed CA TV Regulations, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 244, 24647 (1970).
To date, apparently only one cable system has been able to get retransmission consent
even on an experimental basis. Top Vision Cable Co., 26 F.C.C.2d 869 (1970); 23 F.C.C.2d
958 (1970); 18 F.C.C.2d 1051 (1969). In fact, the Commission probably never intended to
grant interim authorization in more than a very few situations. Hearings on Regulation
of CATV Systems Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1969) (statement of
R. Hyde, Chairman, FCC).
8 See Botein, supra note 7, at 252.
9 Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11045, 11046 (1970).
10 On November 11, 1971 the National Cable Television Association, National Association of Broadcasters, and Association of Maximum Service Telecasters signed a distant
signal pact under the sponsorship of the Commission. See Botein, Cable TV: A OneDegree Thaw in the Freeze?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
11 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251 (1972). The new rules are basically an
amalgam of the cable-broadcaster pact (note 10 supra) and the Commission's 1971 letter of
intent to the Congress (22 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1759, 1761-65 (1971) (letter from Dean
Burch, Chairman, FCC, to the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, August 5, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Burch Letter]). Although they allow importation of two independent distant signals into the major markets, the new rules allow
broadcasters to prevent carriage of any given program by contracting with copyright
owners for exclusivity. 37 Fed. Reg. at 3286,
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The cable freeze is a fact of life which everyone except the Commission acknowledges. 12 The tactic is not new to the Commission, however, and has traditionally been favored by regulators faced with a new
technology; 13 a freeze was once applied to radio by the Secretary of
Commerce,14 and then later to television by the FCC.15 The CATV
freeze, however, has transformed the distant signal issue into a political
question. In the process, the Commission has largely lost sight of cable's
ability to develop innovative services and programs.
Since cable television can potentially provide extremely diverse
programming, it poses a number of thorny regulatory problems. The
desirability of increased diversity may be open to question; but even
if it is not, effective methods to ensure diversity on cable television have
not yet emerged. Conventional modes of broadcast regulation appear at
best inappropriate and at worst futile. Regulation of cable ownership
is more promising, but not the ultimate solution. Only an enforceable
right of access will guarantee that all programmers can use the cable
and, conversely, that viewers will see a wide range of programming.
Implementing a right of access, however, is far more difficult than
creating it. None of the three possible alternatives-marketplace regulation, administrative regulation, and formula regulation-is itself satisfactory. A combination of all three approaches thus seems most
appropriate.
I
DrvEsiTY, AccFss, AND THE

RIGHT To HEAR

Although program diversity has always had a talismanic quality,
the FCC has never adequately defined its form or the method for effectively achieving it. In lifting the televison freeze, 16 for example, the
Commission set a goal largely incompatible with diversity--"maximum
local service."'17 The Commission established a frequency allocation
12 CATV Interim Procedures, 16 P & F RADio RrG. 2D 1517, 1529 (dissenting opinion);

Hearings,supra note 7, at 76 (statement of F. Ford, President, National Cable Television
Association); Botein, supra note 7, at 257.
13 See LeDuc, The F.C.C. v. CATV et al.: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Action, 23
FED. CoM. Bj. 93 (1969).
14 See Minisian, The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920's, 12 J. LAW &
ECON. 391, 396-97 (1969). The Secretary of Commerce continually discouraged applicants
for radio licenses, refusing to issue them as late as 1926. Id.
15 FCC Docket No. 48-2182 (1948), cited in Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905

(1952).
16 Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
17 Id. at 3912.
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system that gave priority to applicants who would serve areas not served
by any other station. This noble plan turned out to be a notable flop.
The "UHF handicap"--the poor signal quality of ultra high frequency
(UHF) stations and the lack of UHF tuners on most television receivers
-apparently scared away potential applicants who calculated that UHF
stations would get smaller audiences than very high frequency (VHF)
stations. Even the All-Channel Receiver Act18 and the resulting increase
in UHF set penetration 0 failed to encourage many investments. 20 But
although most observers have abandoned the plan, 21 the Commission
still remains wedded to its dead or dying goals22 and has somewhat
fanatically sought to preserve them, even to the point of authorizing
translator and satellite transmitters to fill in the white areas left by
23
unbuilt UHF stations.
Responsibility for this debacle cannot, of course, be laid solely at
the Commission's door. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson recently remarked that the basic problem is attributable to the economic structure of broadcasting, a fact which cannot be changed for all the "vast
wasteland speeches" in the world.2 4 Advertising revenue is, of course, a
broadcaster's lifeblood, and advertisers pay only on the basis of the number of viewers. As Marshall McLuhan has noted, advertisers "would
gladly pay the reader, listener, or viewer directly for his time and attention if they knew how to do so."25 Broadcasters thus operate under an
economic imperative to cast their appeal broadly26 and to avoid offend18 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(s), 330 (1970).
19 By 1970, 68% of all television sets could receive UHF signals. W. JONES, REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK 13 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970)
[hereinafter cited as JONES].
20 See Webbink, The Impact of UHF Promotion: The All-Channel Television Law,
34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 535 (1969).

21 See JONES 18; Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An Analysis of FCC
Policy and an Alternative, 34 LAw & CoNTEAar. PaOB. 562, 563-65 (1969); Botein, supra note
7,at 256; WVebbink, supra note 20, at 561; Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79
HARv. L. REv. 866, 386 (1965).
22 The Commission seems to feel that because of the investment the nation has made
in UHF sets and stations-a figure which Webbink sets at $6,000,000 per UHF station
(Webbink, supra note 20, at 552-53)-CATV cannot be allowed to destroy UHF. Notice of
Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, I F.C.C.2d 453, 469 (1965). The Commission
fails to recognize that its own insistence on UHF's success has created this very investment.
23 Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 8 F.C.C.2d 569
(1967); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 15 (1965).
24 Junker, The Greening of Nicholas Johnson, Rolling Stone, April 1, 1971, at 32.
25 M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS O)' MAN 185 (1964).
28 See Barnett & Greenberg, A Proposalfor Wired City Television, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 4 (1968); Blank, The Quest for Quantity and Diversity in Television Programming, 56
Am. EcON. REv. 448 (1966); Cox, The FCC's Role in Television Programming Regulatton,
14 Vu.L. L. REV. 590, 593-94 (1969).
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ing viewers 2 7-the kitsch factor. In its infancy, radio idealistically
eschewed advertising in favor of public service. 28 The harsh facts of
economic life, however, almost immediately forced broadcasters to accept advertising and thus advertiser sovereignty,2 9 a situation now actively perpetuated by the networks 0 and the National Association of
Broadcasters. 3 ' Moreover, the quest for mass appeal is common not just
33
2
to broadcasting, but to all mass media. As newspapers,8 magazines,
and motion pictures34 came of age, each in turn surrendered to the requirements of mass appeal to maximize profits.
As a result, broadcasters engage in a rigorous form of self-censorship. Compounding the irony, they invoke the first amendment to oppose any requirements which might reduce their mass appeal and hence
their advertising revenue.3 5 But there are now faint signs of change.
Commentators have posited a first amendment right of access to the
mass media36 and, correlatively, a first amendment right to hear.3 7 The
27 Cf. Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HAv. L. Rzv. 445, 449 (1959).
28 See L. WHITE, THE AmmucN RADIO 68 (1947).
29 See Bryant, Historical and Social Aspects of Concentration of Program Control in
Television, 34 LAw & CoNtrmP. PRoB. 610, 613-14 (1969). See also N. JOHNSON, How TO
TALK BAcK TO YOUR TELEvISION SEt 18-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON].
30 N. MINOW, EQUAL TiME: THE PRrVATE BROADcAsrER AND THE PUBUC INREST 40

(1964); Bryant, supra note 29, at 622-29.
31 See Hearings, supra note 7, at 807 (testimony of D. Anello, General Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters). In fact, it appears that the NAB's initial call for
broadcasters to avoid programming on controversial issues was prompted by advertisers.

L. WHITE, supra note 28, at 75.
82 See Schramm, Its Development, in MAss MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS 44, 49-52
(C. Steinberg ed. 1966).

33 See Wood, Magazine Publishing Today, in id. 172, 174-76.
34 See Inglis, The Social Role of the Screen, in id. 204, 206-10.
35 See 2 Z. CHsAmE, GOvERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONs 794-95 (1947); JOHNSON
82; Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. Rv. 1641,
1660-61 (1967).

The broadcasters' selective invocation of the first amendment is shown by their willingness, and even enthusiasm, to accept radical restrictions on their range of expression, as
long as the expression involved is not profitable. Thus the Commission's famous Mayflower ban on radio editorializing (Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 833 (1940))
went unchallenged and was apparently welcomed by broadcasters. See L. WHTE, supra
note 28, at 177; Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster'sDilemma, 32 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 719, 735-36 (1964); but cf. Note, The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE
L.J. 759 (1950).

36 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 35; Note, The Federal Communications Commission's
Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass
Media, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 294 (1969); Note, A Fairness Doctrine for the Press, 40 N.D.L.
R.,v. 817 (1964).
37 See W. HocKING, FREEDom OF THE PREsS 161-93 (1947); Note, The Listener's Right
to Hear in Broadcasting,22 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1970).
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labels are unimportant, however, since each formulation is just an
alternative means of approaching the same problem of diversity. Although the courts have yet to accept these broad rights, in recent years
the Supreme Court has shown an increasing concern with access, at
least by way of dictum.38 The courts appear at least ready to uphold
regulatory provisions favoring diversity against traditional attacks based
on first amendment slogans. 39
Expecting traditional broadcasters to change their orientation at
this late date without a total industry restructuring would be unrealistic.
As a new and accordingly malleable medium, however, cable television
can be styled to provide a quantum jump in diversity. The problem thus
is to ensure that it does so.
Broadcast technology restricts a television station to only one channel, but cable technology allows a cable system to have a still undetermined maximum number of channels. Few existing systems actually
operate more than twelve channels, 40 but forty or fifty channel capacities
are technologically feasible even now. 41 CATV thus makes it possible to
shift communications from an economy of "scarcity" 42 to one of "abundance." 43 The traditional kitsch factor accordingly becomes unneccessary
and perhaps even unprofitable;4 conversely, catering to specialized interests becomes economically feasible.
Cable television is not, however, the Ubermensch of the communications world. Cable's development of new communications services has
been touted too highly45 by both members of the industry and inhabitants of the wasteland.46 Thus, two-way communications services between subscribers are not likely to be available in the near future; the
38 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1971); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367, 290 (1969); Grisvold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
39 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 867 (1969); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1

(1945).
40

Only 157 out of 2,578 CATV systems have more than 12-channel capability. 41

TELEVISION FAcraoox: SERVICES VOLUME 82-a (1971).

41 Burch Letter 1771-72.

42 See text accompanying note 275 infra.

43 Burch Letter 1771.
44 See notes 117-19 and accompanying text infra.
45 See, e.g., Johnson, CATV: Promiseand Peril, SATURDAY REviEw, Nov. 11, 1967, at 87.
46 See Mayor's Advisory Task Force on CATV and Telecommunications, Report on
Cable Television and Cable Telecommunications in New York City, Sept. 14, 1968, at 11-12.
Even the author of an excellent and innovative study of access to CATV has fallen into a
similar trap. Note, Common Carrier CATV: Problems and Proposals, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 533, 539-40 (1971).
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necessary switching and filtering equipment is far beyond current or
even envisioned cable capabilities. 47 Even the most optimistic planner
must contemplate working with a high capacity but-aside from limited
nonvoice feedback 4 8-- essentially one-way system.
The FCC has, of course, long recognized CATV's ability to provide
program diversity,4 9 and it has become increasingly aware of possible
new services.50 Although at one point the Commission was apparently
attempting to equate cable with subscription television,5 ' more recently
it has taken limited steps towards exploiting its capabilities. 52 In doing
so it has, unfortunately, only barely suggested the dimensions of the
diversity problem.
Even assuming that the Commission is capable of styling cable's
growth to create maximum feasible diversity, the ultimate problem is
whether it should bother to do so. "Diversity, ....
access," and "the right
to hear" are attractive slogans, but they may be devoid of any real meaning. The McLuhan attitude would presumably dismiss any effort to
encourage diversity as just another futile attempt to control thd uncontrollable. 53 The logical ektension of this reasoning, however, would
simply be to cashier the whole Commission and save the taxpayers some
money, a notion not without a certain appeal. Even McLuhan might
stop short of such reasoning, however, since the only method of medium
control he acknowledges is a change of medium, 54 which CATV certainly represents.
In addition, even if not foredoomed to failure, attempts to promote
diversity may not be desirable. The short answer to the quest for diversity may simply be that the public, as distinguished from the often
obscure "public interest" which the Commission administers, gets
kitsch because it wants kitsch. 5 As one commentator has noted, it may
be unfair to "reproach the television industry for the immorality of
47 See JONES 176-80.

48 W. BAER, INTERAmnrE TELEVISION: PROsPEctS FOR TWO-WAY SERVICES ON CABLE
64-66 (1971). The Commission seems to have just such a limited capability in mind. Fourth
Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3289 (1972).
49 First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 698-99 (1965); Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.
403, 436 (1959).
50 See text accompanying notes 104-19 infra; see also Burch Letter 1171-72.
51 See Botein, supra note 7, at 257-58.

52 See text accompanying notes 104-19 infra.
53 M. McLUHAN, supra note 25, at 52.
54 See generally id. at 7-8.
55 Blank, supra note 26, at 449-50.
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giving us what we want." 56 Many people are satisfied with one source of
programming, 57 and even minority groups may prefer soothing trivia to
disturbing "social realism.""" More important, tailoring programs to
individual preferences may only facilitate the isolation of already alienated individuals. 9 Diversity may be only an elitist slogan60 and mass
appeal programming may be necessary partly to hold society together. 61
Our society is fundamentally pluralistic, however, and thus must
tolerate and promote diversity. Diversity is a double-edged concept,
important not only to those receiving communication but also to those
seeking to communicate. Inability to communicate may lead to frustration,62 and frustration may lead to violence. A riot, the late Doctor
Martin Luther King said, is the "language of the unheard."6' The
Kerner Commission indicted the media precisely for contributing to
this frustration, noting that "the communications media, ironically,
have failed to communicate."'64 Moreover, airing diverse views may
enable society eventually to understand and thus resolve its divisions;
increased cultural diversity may also result. Though the cries to improve the quality of television programming may well be elitist in nature, cable television's huge channel capacity may allow it to serve a
wide variety of individual tastes, from opera to minority group drama to
motorcycle races.
If CATV can provide increased diversity, the problem is to ensure
that it does so. There are, in fact, a number of available alternatives.
56

Alexander, Public Television and the "Ought" of Public Policy, 1968

WASH.

U.L.Q.

35, 68.
57

Wilcox, Newspaper Journalism, Broadcast Journalism, and the Community, in 2

PROVESSIONAL STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF COMmENTS OF AMERICAN

NEWSpAPER PUBLISHERS

As-

FCC Docket No. 18110, at C-20 to -21 (1971).
58 Address by R. Jencks, President, CBS Broadcast Group, 1971 Broadcasting Industry
Symposium, Jan. 18, 1971, on file at the Cornell Law Review.
59 Barrow & Mannell, Communications Technology--A Forecast of Change (Part II),
34 LAw & CONTESP. PROB. 431, 444 (1969). On the other hand, regular television programming may have already created its own distinct dependency. G. STEINER, THE PEOPLE LooK
AT TELEVISION 25, 37, 99 (1963). One of Steiner's subjects remarked, "When [the set] is out
of order I feel like someone is dead." Id. at 25.
60 Television has traditionally been less desired and viewed by the more affluent and
better educated segments of the population. ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., AN FxrENDED
VImW OF PUBLIC ATrrruDEs TowARD TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA 1959-1971, 5-6
(1971). The classic study of viewer attitudes found a marked disparity between what programs the more affluent and better educated viewers thought television should provide
and what they actually chose to watch. G. STEINER, supra note 59, at 158-60.
61 See Address by R. Jencks, supra note 58.
62 Hartley & Hartley, The Importance and Nature of Communication, in MAss MEDIA
AND COMMUNICATION 8, 9-11 (C. Steinberg ed. 1966).
63 Quoted in JOHNSON 101.
64 NATIONAL ADVISORY COs&'3MN ON CIVIL DisoD.ERs, REPORT 210 (1968).
SOCIATION,
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II
TRADITIONAL MODES OF REGULATION: PUBLIC

INTEREST OR PUBLIC RELATIONS?
In four decades of regulating single-channel broadcasting, the FCC
has, of necessity, adopted a number of devices to encourage diversity.
Most have promoted this goal only indirectly, however, and all have
been administered somewhat less than enthusiastically.
First, the Commission has always required a potential licensee to
show that it will provide better service than any competing applicant. 5
Though fine in theory, comparative licensing hearings have never
worked for a variety of reasons, most of them attributable to the FCC
itself. The Commission has never bothered to enumerate the relevant
comparative factors,66 and has often applied its existing broad criteria
inconsistently. 67 To compound this confusion, comparative hearings
have often reflected a degree of political influence.,"
Thus the CATV comparative hearing requirement proposed by
some observers6 9 might do little to encourage diversity. A Commission
unable to discharge its existing obligations adequately7" is unlikely to
be capable of effectively licensing several thousand more entities.7 ' Perhaps in recognition of this inability, the FCC until recently left all
questions of character qualifications to the discretion of the local cable
307(a) (1970).
86 Cf. Tennessee Cablevision, Inc., 11 F.C.C.2d 154 (1967); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767
(1957). For an excellent discussion of the inherent subjectivity of comparative hearing
decisions, see R. ANTHONY, COMPARATIVE BROADCAST LICENSING PROCEEINGS: MAKING THEM
SIMPLER AND MORE OBJECTIVE 34-42 (1971).
67 See Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEo. L.J. 655,
669-93 (1959).
68 See id. at 693. See also Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77
HARv. L. REv. 701, 716 (1964). In one instance the suggestion of political influence was so
strong that the Commission itself set aside a previous grant of a construction permit to one
station over another. WKAT, Inc., 29 F.C.C. 221 (1958).
69 E.g., FoRD FOUNDATION, COMrMENTS OF THE FORD FOUNDATION IN RESPONSE TO THE
COMMISSION's NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING OF JULY 1, 1970, FCC Docket No. 18892, at
18 n.9 (1970); ef. JONES 187-88. The Commission's new rules, which demand "a full public
proceeding affording due process," seem to require local authorities to hold at least some
form of hearing before franchising a cable system. 37 Fed. Reg. at 3281.
70 See Broadcasting in America and the F.C.C.'s License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 126 (1968) (dissenting opinion). For an old but still
accurate assessment of the inadequacy of the FCC's staff, see W. JONES, LICENSING OF
MAJOR BROADCAST FACIIrIES BY THE FEDERAL COMsMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 223-24 (1962).
71 There are currently about 8,200 franchised but unactivated CATV systems in the
United States. Knox, supra note 1, at 24. Under the Commission's new rules, existing
systems are grandfathered until either the expiration of their franchises or March 31, 1977,
whichever occurs first. 37 Fed. Reg. at 3281.
05 See 47 U.S.C. §
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franchising authorities;7 2 the new regulations, however, specify that the
franchising authority must evaluate the applicant's character after a
"full public proceeding affording due process.173 Recent disclosures of
corruption in cable franchising7 4 indicate that the local level may be
more rife with undue influence than the federal level.
Second, the Communications Act always required the FCC to consider petitions opposing renewal of a station's license7 5 But if comparative hearings are ineffective at times, renewal proceedings are almost
farcical. Broadcasters treat their licenses as vested rights, 76 not as the
privileges which they are by law.77 Thus when an undermanned Commission 78 after twelve years of litigation finally refused to renew the
license of WHDH-TV, 79 it unnerved many broadcasters. Under threat
of impending legislation," o a reconstituted Commission immediately
sought to immunize licensees from challenges, 8' only to be reversed, in
what has become a familiar scenario, by the District of Columbia Circuit. 2 Basically the same drama has been performed with license transfers. 3 The Commission recently proposed a requirement that renewal
applicants submit a survey of their communities' programming needs; S4
72 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,044 (1970). See Botein, CATV
Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions,45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 816, 825-26 (1970).

73 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3281 (1972).
74 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 21, 1971, at 95, col. 2; id., March 28, 1971, at 31, col. 1;
id., March 24, 1971, at 78, col. 6. In October 1971, Irving Kahn, president of TelePrompTer, the largest of the CATV franchisers, was convicted of bribing local Pennsylvania
officials. Id., Oct. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
75 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1970). The scope of standing to challenge a proposed renewal
was broadened considerably by Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 859 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
76 JOHNSON 20.
77 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(d), 309(h) (1970).
78 Only four commissioners participated in the WHDH decision, with one concurring
and one dissenting. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969).
79 Id.
80 S.2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) was introduced by Senator John 0. Pastore to
overturn the WHDH precedent.
81 The Commission said that licenses would be renewed as long as the applicant

could show that his performance had been "substantially attuned to meeting the needs
and interests of [his] area"--admittedly a rather low standard. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424,
424-25 (1970) (footnote omitted). The Commission also made challenges even more difficult by refusing to approve out of pocket expense settlements between licensees and challengers. KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603 (1970).
82 Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84 Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27
F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). The Commission is also considering a requirement that a licensee
broadcast public notice in advance of a renewal application. Notice of Inquiry and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 3902 (1971).
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whether this only represents public relations, however, remains to be
seen.
If the Commission's record in broadcast license renewals has been
less than satisfactory, Commission control of cable franchise renewals
would be totally ineffective in encouraging diversity, since franchises
usually run for terms much longer than the statutory three-year license. 85 Moreover, the Commission is no more able to handle this
additional regulatory burden than comparative hearings. 8
Third, the Commission's fairness doctrine requires that broadcasters give reply time if they carry programs that express one side of
a controversial issue.87 The scope of the fairness doctrine, always unclear, has been further obfuscated since the FCC held it applicable to
cigarette advertisements8 8 but not to other product commercials.89 The
doctrine requires broadcasters affirmatively to seek out opposing points
of view only after one side of a controversial issue has been broadcast.90
As a result, many licensees 9 ' effectively avoid the duty to provide reply
time by remaining silent on particular controversial issues.9 2 Fairness
85 JoNEs 126-27. The New York City franchise, for example, is 20 years. New York City
Bd. of Estimate, Proposed Form of Contract with Sterling Information Services, Ltd. § 4
(1970). 47 U.S.C. § 507(d) (1970) sets a maximum license duration of three years. The
Commission's new rules, however, require only that initial and renewal franchises be of
"reasonable duration." 37 Fed. Reg. at 3281.
86 See Burch Letter 1781.
87 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 14 Fed. Reg. 3055 (1948). The fairness doctrine's requirement of reply time to editorials and personal attacks was codified in 47
C.F.R. § 73.598 (1971).
88 WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967); 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967). See also National Broadcasting Co., 80 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971), where the Commission held the doctrine applicable
to advertising by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey concerning the proposed
Alaska pipeline.
89 In Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court remanded for reconsideration a case in which the Commission had refused to extend fairness to automobile advertisements on the ground that it could find no rational distinction
between the advertising of automobiles and cigarettes. See Note, The Fairness Doctrine,
the Automobile, and Ecological Awareness: An Affirmative Role for the Electronic Media
in the Pollution Crisis, 57 CoRNEL. L. REv. 121 (1971). The Commission has recently announced a full scale inquiry into the efficacy of the fairness doctrine. Notice of Inquiry,
30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
90 WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADIO RE. 548 (1958); Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADIo REG. 339 (1958); Alabama Broadcasting System, Inc., 17
P & F RADIo REG. 273 (1958).
91 See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness"Doctrine, 87 U. COLO. L. Rev. 31, 35 (1964).
92 A refusal to treat major issues might be regarded as a violation of a licensee's
general public service responsibilities. See FCC, REPORT ON PUBLIC SERVICE REsPONSIBUTY
OF A BROADcksr LICESEE (1946). The Commission has never taken this position, however.
On the other hand, in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642
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has been supplemented by "lifted eyebrow" regulation, 3 but only to a
limited extent.
The FCC has expressly applied fairness to cable-originated programsY4 But the doctrine's requirement of an initial one-sided statement makes fairness an inappropriate vehicle for providing diversity
on cable's many channels; fairness may indeed create practical difficulties on a public access channel.9 5 In fact, the doctrine would actually
provide proportionately less diversity on CATV than on broadcast
television because of cable's greater channel capacity.
Finally, the Commission has always exerted subtle control over
program content. The "Blue Book ' 97 lays down some general programming guidelines, although in practice it has proven too vague to be
effective.98 Additionally, the FCC continually vacillates between a
hands off policy, as with the "Selling of the Pentagon," 99 and a heavy
handed treatment of particular programming, as with the "drug lyrics"
confusion. 00° More recently, the Commission has proposed requiring
minimum percentages of public service programs' 01 and has launched
an inquiry into children's programs. 0 2 These efforts may well turn out
to be window dressing, however, owing to the subjective nature and
03
administrative difficulty of program content control.

So far, the Commission's only attempt to shape cable programming
has come somewhat indirectly, through the origination requirement'"
(D.C. Cir. 1971), the D.C. Circuit broke new ground by holding that a potential user had
a first amendment right to buy advertising time.
93 Sullivan, supra note 85, at 724. See also Note, supra note 68, at 703; Comment, The
Federal Communications Commission and Program Regulation-Violation of the First
Amendment?, 41 NEB. L. R.v. 826, 836 (1962).
94 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3288 (1972).
95 Text accompanying note 205 infra.
96 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) bans any "censorship" by the Commission.
97 FCC, supra note 92.
98 Cox, supra note 26, at 594-96.
99 Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, 80 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971).
100 Licensee Responsibility To Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d
409 (1971). The Commission advised broadcast licensees that it expected them to examine,
before broadcast, the selections played by the station and to make a "good faith" effort
to ascertain the words or lyrics and their meaning. Later the Commission issued a
clarification, in which it maintained that it had not meant to lay down a rule for licensees,
but rather just to draw their attention to a matter within their discretion. Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 21 P & F RADio REG. 2D 1698 (1971).
101 Notice of Inquiry, 27 F.C.C.2d 580 (1971).
102 Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 86 Fed. Reg. 1429 (1971).
103 See Jaffe, Program Control, 14 ViLL. L. REy. 619 (1969); Note, supra note 37, at
881-82.
104 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3287 (1972). This requirement was
first imposed in 1969 (First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969)) and was reaffirmed
in 1970 (Memorandum Opinion and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 10901 (1970)).
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and the antisiphoning regulations. 10 5 Although it appears to be an
article of faith 10 6 that all cable systems with more than 3,500 subscribers
must originate their own programming "to a significant extent,"'17 the
Commission as late as 1966 still opposed even voluntary cable origination. 108 Like the National Association of Broadcasters, 10 9 the FCC apparently feared that cable would develop into subscription television, 110
which it was then attempting to freeze."' The Commission has, how2
ever, now come full circle: it has not only authorized pay channels,"
but has also criticized cable systems for not originating enough programs." 3 After finally winning acceptance, 114 though, origination has
turned out to be considerably more difficult and expensive than initially
expected. 1 5 As a result, origination alone will not create diversity on
cable.""
105 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3288-89 (1972).

106 Burch Letter 1770.
107 The rule has been at least temporarily invalidated by Midwest Video Corp. v.
United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of that decision's validity,
see text accompanying notes 253-56 infra.
108 Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 765 (1966); First Report and Order,
683, 751-52 (1965). Although the policy has now been changed (Fourth Report
F.C.C.
38
and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3292-97 (1972)), the Commission also had made it difficult
for cable systems to originate their own programs when it prevented the use of the Community Antenna Relay Service to send CATV-produced programs to a cable head-end.
Second Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.2d 709 (1968). By contrast, the Canadian RadioTelevision Commission very quickly and easily decided that origination should be encouraged. See Hearings,supra note 7, at 290-91.
109 See Hearings, supra note 7, at 289-92 (testimony of D. Anello, General Counsel,
National Association of Broadcasters).
110 Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 453, 474 (1965);
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.2d 309, 329 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Second
Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 808 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
111 In many ways, the history of subscription television is similar to that of CATV,
since both have been the victims of delaying tactics. For the tortured background of
subscription television, see Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988 (1955).
112 Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11045 (1970).
113 Id. See also N. FEIDMAN, CABLE TELEVSION: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS IN LoeA.
PROGRAM ORIGINATION (1970); FoRD FOUNDATION, supra note 69, at 9-10.
114 Even Broadcasting,the journal of the broadcaster establishment, seems to regard
origination favorably. It has denounced cable systems for not originating to a greater
extent, although it may have the ulterior motive of relieving broadcasters of the pressure

to produce more public service programming. BROADCASTING, May 10, 1971, at 66 (editorial).
115 One observer found that even where cable systems had high penetration and
strong community support, local programming was difficult to create and finance. N.
FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 19-21.
11 Moreover, even if feasible, origination would result in only a limited increase in

diversity, since the FCC leaves content control in the hands of the cable owner. To create
more television "voices," cable systems must not just originate their own programming,
but must also carry programming from independent sources. For this reason some oh-
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The antisiphoning rules, on the other hand, hold more promise,
even though they were politically motivated and designed primarily to
protect conventional broadcasting. 117 These rules prohibit cable systems from showing (1) films which have been released in movie theaters
within two years prior to cablecasting, (2) sports events which have been
broadcast over a local television station within two years," 8 and (3) conventional television serial programs. By keeping CATV out of the market for kitsch, these rules may have the side effect of forcing cable to
develop innovative programming. Removing cable's ability to buy
most effective means of
mass appeal programming may, in fact, be the
9
programming."
diverse
truly
offer
it
making
The tools that the Commission has forged to regulate broadcasting
will promote little diversity on cable, not only because of their basic
inadequacy, but also because of the quantitative and qualitative differences between the two media. New approaches are therefore necessary.
III
REGULATION OF MEDIUM OWNERSHIP

Regulating medium ownership is one means of indirectly regulating program content 120 and possibly avoiding the necessity of enforcing
a right of access.' 21 Medium ownership is an especially important issue
today, because control of the mass media is highly concentrated. Many
major newspapers, magazines, and broadcast stations are under common
and often cross ownership. 2 2 Traditional modes of regulation can deal
servers have seen the origination requirement, by itself, as an antidiversity factor. Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Midwest Video Corp. v. United
States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
117 See Botein, supra note 72, at 833-34.
118 In 1970, the Commission proposed lengthening the sports delay period to five
years, apparently motivated by the threat of possible legislation. Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11040 (1970).
119 See text accompanying note 172 infra.
120 JOHNSON 46; Cox, supra note 26, at 596-97.
121 See Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of Cable
Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. R-v. 221, 247 (1970).
122 Wood, Magazine Publishing Today, in MAss MDIA AND COMAaUMCAnON 172, 173
(C. Steinberg ed. 1966); C. Sterling, Ownership Characteristics of Broadcasting Stations
and Newspapers in the Top 100 Markets: 1922-1967 (NAB, March 1971).
Common ownership and cross ownership are terms of art as used in mass communica-

tions. Common ownership means control of two or more of the same medium by one
owner; cross ownership means control of two or more different media by the same owner.
Thus a corporation which owns several newspapers and broadcast stations is both a
common and a cross owner.
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only with the most noticeable symptoms of concentrated ownership.
23
Real reform must wait for a basic restructuring of the media.
This problem is particularly acute with a new medium such as
CATV. Owners of existing media have always shown a tendency to
expand into any new medium they cannot destroy,24 not only to profit
from technological innovation, but also to neutralize possible competition.1 5 Thus the first major investors in radio and television were, quite
naturally, newspapers126 Such investment practices, however, inject
capital but no new talent or attitudes into a new medium.
The current heavy cross ownership of cable is therefore not surprising. Perhaps fifty percent of existing cable systems are owned by telephone, broadcasting, or publishing interests 2 7 Moreover, cross owners
often control large or multiple system operations. In New York City,
for example, Hughes Aircraft effectively controls TelePrompTer, which
serves ten percent of the nation's cable subscribers,2 8 and Time-Life
owns a voting majority of Sterling's stock.129
The effect of cross ownership on diversity is probably incapable
of exact quantification. 180 Considering those instances in which cross
owners' attempts to influence their media have been documented,'113
however, it seems fair to assume that cross ownership is generally an
antidiversity factor. 132 Cross ownership of CATV is especially danger.23 See JOHNSON 23.

124 See Wilcox, supra note 57, at C-17 to -18; Sterling, supra note 122, at 22.
125 See Head, Some Inter-Media Relationships, in MASS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS
278 (C. Steinberg ed. 1966); Smith, The Wired Nation, THE NATION, May 18, 1970, at 582,

589.
126 See Head, supra note 125, at 278; Sterling, supra note 122, at 102-37.
127 41 TEiSION FAcaraoor: SFavicFs VoLusm 82-a (1971) lists broadcaster ownership
at 29.7%, telephone at 5.1%, and publishing at 6.8%. On the other hand, Jones gives
figures of 36.5%, 5.8%, and 8.2% respectively. JONES 165.
128 JONES 164. Jones also notes that 20% of all subscribers are served by four CATV
companies and 30% by eight. Id.
129 Better T.V., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 984 (1970), rev'd, 31 F.C.C.2d 939 (1971). TelePrompTer and Sterling are the only cable systems franchised to operate in Manhattan;
they have divided the island neatly in half. See generally Reisig, Dealing the Power in the
"Wired Nation," Village Voice, Feb. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
130 But see H. Levin, The Policy on Joint Ownership of Newspapers and Television
Stations: Some Assumptions, Objectives, and Effects, Center for Policy Research, April
1971.
131 For example, IT&T exerted pressure to get favorable publicity for its merger with
the American Broadcasting Company. See JOHNSON 55-57.
132 See Barnett, supra note 121, at 294; H. Levin, supra note 130, at 44. The theory
is that cross owners are motivated not only to censor their media, but also to downgrade
one medium in order to upgrade another. Thus the reasoning behind the Commission's
ban on cable ownership by a local television station (note 136 infra) is that the owner
will either hold back the cable system's development to protect his station or will
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ous, since the owner controls not just one or two channels, but rather
13 3
one or two dozen, and potentially, under a "wired nation" concept,
all. Thus, the most basic step in ensuring cable diversity is to free it
from the control of other media.
Only recently has the FCC begun to move in this direction. For
obvious reasons broadcasters have always favored broadcast cross ownership of CATV, 134 and at one point the Commission appeared to agree.' 35
More recently, however, the Commission has banned cable system ownership by networks, local television stations, 3 6 and telephone companies. 13 7 The efficacy of the prohibition seems doubtful. Some owners
abandon the station in favor of the more profitable cable system. Though such monopoly
conduct is attractive because of its relative ease, it may be economically irrational; the
sophisticated cross owner can probably maximize his profits by fully developing both
media along different and minimally competitive lines, for example, by providing traditional mass appeal programming on his television broadcasts and innovative and
specialized programming on his cable system. Too many cross owners, however, are not
so sophisticated about their self-interest and thus restrictions become necessary.
33 Smith, supra note 125, is responsible for this phrase which forecasts a nation in
which every household has broadband cable service.
134 Hearings, supra note 7, at 297 (testimony of D. Anello, General Counsel, National
Association of Broadcasters).
135 In its First Report, the Commission actually said that
[t]here is an element of unfairness in certain aspects of the competition offered by
CATV systems to television broadcasting stations. Therefore it seems appropriate
to permit this unfairness to be eliminated, in some cases, at least, by the union
of the economic interests involved.
1 F.C.C.2d 387, 389 (1965). This attitude was abandoned in 1967 (see Notice of Inquiry,
7 F.C.C.2d 853 (1967); Order, 7 F.C.C.2d 856 (1967)) and comments on the general problem
of cross ownership were solicited in the 1968 proposed rule making. Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 426 (1968).
136 See Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3290 (1972). In Allied Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 435 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court upheld the Commission's
denial of a radio station license on the grounds, inter alia, that the applicant also owned
a local cable system.
A number of state and local authorities also have either taken or proposed action to
limit cross ownership. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 711.170 (1969); BETrER BROADcAsrING
COUNCIL, A MODEL ORDINANCE FOR CABLE TELEVIsIoN FOR THE Crry or CHICAGO § 2.15
(1970); (1971) Ill. Sen. Int. No. 169 § 5(b) (Mr. Clarke); (1970) N.Y. Assy. Int. No. 6700-A
§ 671(3) (Mr. Kelly); New York City Bd. of Estimate, supra note 85, § 18.
137 Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), prohibited all telephone company ownership of CATV, either directly or through affiliated corporations. This merely
codified the Commission's previous practice of refusing to grant to telephone companies
certificates of convenience and necessity for leasing lines to controlled cable systems.
General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 462-63 (1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 888 (1969).
The Commission's concern over telephone company dominance appears more than
justified. The Better T.Y. case showed a pattern in both New York City and rural communities of telephone company conduct designed to use its control over duct space and
pole attachments to force cable systems to lease telephone channel facilities rather than
use their own cables. Better T.V., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 984 (1970), rev'd, 31 F.C.C.2d 939
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have already traded off cable or broadcast television properties to avoid
a local cross ownership prohibition, and CBS was able, despite stockholder and Commission opposition, to spin off its cable interests into asingle corporate package. 138 More importantly, there seems no reason
to limit the prohibition to local stations, networks, or telephone companies. The Commission is apparently concerned with developing more
local voices, not with preventing conflicts of interest. 139 The ban should
therefore be extended to all cable cross ownership.' 40
The case against common ownership, however, is somewhat weaker
than that against cross ownership. Although once comparatively rare,141
(1971). The hearing examiner in that case had found that the telephone company had

not discriminated against cable systems and had cautioned against "appeals to prejudice
against the telephone company because of its size, alleged monopoly status, or alleged
failings in other areas." 31 F.C.C.2d at 1057. The Commission read the evidence differently

and reversed upon a finding that the telephone company had used its position "to undue
and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage" in the rural areas. 31 F.C.C.2d at 967.
Telephone company activities in other states evidence similar attempts to limit CATV.
See, e.g., International Cable T.V. Corp. v. All Metal Fabricators, Inc., 66 P.U.R.3d 44
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966).
CATV has the potential capability to provide many and perhaps all of the services
now provided by a telephone company. See Johnson, supra note 45. Creation of one unified
company to provide a national communications grid might certainly be desirable. See
Barnett & Greenberg, supra note 26, at 20; Smith, supra note 125, at 602-03. On the other
hand, such a consolidation should result from competition and an eventual regulated
merger, not from one medium's acquisition of another at the latter's very beginning.
138 CBS initially proposed to spin off its cable and program syndication interests into
a new corporation, Viacom International, which would have long term contracts with CBS
for selling CBS programs and which would be run by a board of directors dominated by
former CBS employees. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 9, 11 (1971). The
Commission ordered a last minute stay to distribution of Viacom stock (Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 26 F.C.C.2d 901 (1970)), but ultimately allowed it after Viacom amended its
plan to provide for a minority of former CBS employees on its board, for future contract
provisions pursuant to FCC order, and for voting trusts for Viacom stock held by major
CBS stockholders (30 F.C.C.2d at 15-16). Despite the amendments to the original plan,
however, it seems inevitable that CBS will retain substantial control over Viacom.
Practically all of Viacom's employees were formerly with CBS and presumably retain
some form of residual identification with the network. The minority of CBS directors
may well be able to use their past experience to influence other members of the
board.
139 See Botein, supra note 72, at 837.
140 The Commission may feel that radio-CATV cross ownership is less pernidous
than television-CATV cross ownership, since the two media have different audiences and
thus different potential advertisers. Second Report and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 10903 (1970).
See also Barnett, supra note 121, at 323. Nevertheless, this approach seems inconsistent
with the goal of maximizing voices. Moreover, the two media may soon be aggressively
competing for the same advertising revenues, since rates for cable are closer to those for
radio than for broadcast television.
141 M. SELDEN, AN ECONoMc ANALYSIS OF COMMuNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYsTEms
AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDusTrY 60 (1965).
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common ownership of cable systems is now apparently increasing as
indicated by the emergence of TelePrompTer as the industry giant.142
A common owner can, to be sure, control a number of voices, 143 but he
has less economic incentive to do so than a cross owner. 44 On the other
hand, because of its huge channel capacity, common ownership of
CATV is far more dangerous than common ownership of other media.
Common ownership does, of course, facilitate creation of the cable networks now apparently favored by the Commission; 145 in fact, TelePrompTer has already planned such operations. 46
Although aware of the problem of common ownership, 147 the Commission has not yet attempted to resolve it. In its 1970 rule-making proceeding it proposed two alternative limitations on common ownership,
one based on geography, the other on number of subscribers. 14 Neither
is satisfactory. 149 Widespread network control over affiliates shows that
interconnection can be achieved without common ownership. Although
attracting venture capital to cable systems is a very real problem, the
FCC has until recently' 50 left the terms of cable franchises to local governments and thus to negotiations between cable systems and local
authorities. 151
A total ban on cross ownership and common ownership would
142 See note 128 and accompanying text supra. CATV common owners are often cross
owners as well, as TelePrompTer again illustrates.
143 See H. LvIN, supra note 130, at 6-8.
144 Levin, Competition, Diversity, and the Television Group Ownership Rule, 70
CoLum. L. REv. 791 (1970); Symposium: The Role of Competition in Transportation and
Communications, 39 A.B.A. ANTrrrusr L.J. 465, 489-90 (1970) (remarks of E. Jennes).
145 Burch Letter 1774.

146 BROADCAsrING,

June 14, 1971, at 28.

147 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 Fed. Reg. 19028, 19032 (1968).
148 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 35 Fed. Reg. 11042 (1970).
The first alternative, apparently the product of a compromise between the Commission's
general counsel and the Cable Television Bureau (BROADCASTING, June 15, 1970, at 18),
would limit a common owner to a total of 50 cable systems, with further limitations on
the number he may own within various standard metropolitan statistical areas, states,
and adjoining states. 35 Fed. Reg. 11042, 11043 (1970). The second alternative, which apparently originated with the Commission itself, would simply limit a cable system owner
to a total of two million subscribers. Id.
41'9 See Botein, supra note 72, at 838-89.
10 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3281 (1972).
151 One of the more interesting means proposed for ensuring high quality cable
performance and, at the same time, avoiding the difficulties of attracting venture capital
is to give preference to non-profit operators. FoRD FOUNDATION, supra note 69, at 11-13.
Although there is apparently no noncommercial cable system in operation yet, such an
approach would certainly cure some of the ills created by cross and common ownership,
since a non-profit operator would presumably have no particular economic drum to beat.
It is not a panacea, however, because even noncommercial operators may have a particular
viewpoint to sell.
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have a number of beneficial effects. First, knocking the major powers
out of the game might encourage more competition among prospective
cable systems in the initial franchising process and perhaps even in
providing service within the same franchise area.152 Second, the combination of the origination requirement, the antisiphoning rules, and an
ownership ban might make cable a meaningful competitor of broadcast
television. Intermedia competition is presumably desirable in a free
enterprise system, 153 and CATV might force broadcast television to
improve or at least change its programming,'5 4 just as television affected
radio.155 So far, other types of television have been unable to do so.
Public television has been an unwanted though sometimes patronized
stepchild of commercial television,' 16 and subscription television has
practically been aborted.15 7 Cable television, however, is becoming
economically viable and might thus give commercial television genuine
competition. If the FCC is truly dedicated to providing the public "the
most efficient and effective nationwide communications service possible,"'1 8 it should foster direct competition between CATV and broadcast television.15 9
Diversity of ownership can thus significantly encourage program
152 Competition between cable systems in the same territory has generally been rejected as economically wasteful and not feasible. See, e.g., L. JOHNSON, THE FUrURE OF
CABLE TELEVISION: SOME PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL REGULATION 64 (1970). One commentator,
however, has maintained that local competition is possible as long as it is kept on a reasonably equal plane. R. POSNER, CABLE TELEvis1ON: THE PROBLEM OF LocAL MONOPOLY
8-11 (1970). Professor Posner's argument, however, seems to overlook the fact-which he
admits-that once a cable system is firmly entrenched in a community it becomes almost
impossible for another system to move in. Id. at 10. In the Better T.V. case, the hearing
examiner felt that competition between a franchised and an unfranchised cable system
might produce benefidal effects. Better T.V., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 984 (1970), rev'd, 31 F.C.C.2d
939 (1971). In reversing the hearing examiner, however, the Commission found that in
the context of the case competition between an independent and a telephone-based cable
system would be "wasteful and unnecessary." 31 F.C.C.2d at 948.
153 See Head, supra note 125, at 290-91.
154 The FCC has recognized this potential result of competition between commerdal
television and both cable and subscription television. Fourth Report and Order, 15
F.C.C.2d 466, 505 (1968); First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C.2d 683, 704 (1965).
155 See M. McLUHAN, supra note 25, at 307. As one cable equipment manufacturer
rather bluntly remarked, radio was "fat, dumb, and happy and prospersous ... and didn't
have to [diversify programming] until some other competitive medium made them do it."
Hearings, supra note 7, at 127 (testimony of M. Shapiro, President, General Instrument

Co.).
156 Goldin, Commercial Television, in PuBLic TELEvIsION: A PROGRAw FOR ACrION 227,
228 (Carnegie Comm'n on Educ. Television ed. 1967).
157 See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
158 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 33 Fed. Reg. 19028 (1968).
159 The FCC itself is probably most responsible for centralizing CATV ownership.
The cable freeze (see notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra) has made the business so
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diversity on cable. But because the effect of diverse ownership is necessarily indirect, more affirmative action is necessary as well.
IV
OPENING THE WIRE: IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT OF

A.

ACCESS

Threshold Considerations

Even in the absence of cross or common ownership, giving a cable
operator complete control over all his channels invites neglect and even
abuse. 160 Concentrated control over cable's many channels is inherently
dangerous even without detailed documentation of overt abuse.' 6
Moreover, the issue of access has now become a political hot potato;
many different groups-poor people, public interest groups, educators,
small advertisers-are now demanding access. Professional politicians,
including those traditionally wedded to broadcasting interests, 162 are
becoming increasingly interested in the exposure CATV offers. 163 Access clearly cannot be left solely to the cable operator's discretion. But
although the concept of access is almost universally accepted, no one
has yet proposed a workable means of implementation. 164
Access does, of course, have its costs. Valuable allocations are distributed for free or for less than their highest market value, and for
purposes which do not produce income. It also imposes a social burden
in that viewers are exposed to programming which they might otherwise not select. The economic cost, however, is comparatively slight,
and the social burden is less than that involved in requiring an individual to cross a street if he wishes to avoid a streetcorner speaker; both,
moreover, are justified by the increased diversity and decreased frustration which access can provide.
In theory, regulation of access might be unnecessary if cable made
expensive that only large corporations may be able to afford the unavoidable short term
losses.
160 See Botein, supra note 72, at 839.
161 See JOHNSON 52-53; H. Levin, supra note 130, at 7, n.11.
162 Many politicians are currently tied to broadcasting not only because of their
obvious dependence on it for favorable coverage but also because they have significant
broadcasting investments. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 125, at 592.
163 During the 1968 presidential campaign, the major political parties distributed
videotapes to over 350 cable systems. Smith, supra note 125, at 587. The Democratic National Committee has already approached cable operators about possible carriage of its
videotapes during the 1972 elections. In addition, congressmen from areas not adequately
served by traditional broadcasting have an obvious interest in CATV. See Hearings, supra
note 7, at 247-48 (testimony of Congressman E. Foreman).
164 See Barnett, supra note 121, at 244.
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available an infinite number of channels, since every potential user
would then be guaranteed an allocation. But unlimited capacity is, to
say the least, still a highly speculative proposition. 165 Moreover, even if
available, it would not guarantee users an allocation with a significant
audience.
The first requirement is sufficient channel capacity, more accurately called bandwidth, to accommodate potential users. The FCC's
new rules require major market cable systems to have non-broadcast
bandwidth equal to the amount used for carriage of broadcast signals
and a minimum capacity of twenty channels. 16 6 Though generous, this
approach may be too sweeping in its emphasis on the number of broadcast signals carried, neglecting actual local needs. It would, for example,
require a San Francisco cable system to have almost as much non-broadcast bandwidth as a New York City cable system, 6 7 even though the
former market is one-fourth the size of the latter. 6 In determining
bandwidth requirements, it would be more appropriate, albeit more
complicated, to use a population standard as the Commission has attempted to do with broadcasting.'"
B.

Policy Alternatives

A difficult and perhaps unanswerable problem is who gets access
and how. To date, no one has provided an adequate answer. There are,
of course, a number of alternatives. The first and simplest would be to
do nothing, allowing access to be determined by the marketplace. This
approach is attractive in theory, since it would not only eliminate the
difficulties and costs of regulation but would also provide for system
development according to demands for access. It is subject, however, to
both pragmatic and philosophical objections. A cable operator, like any
other entrepreneur, will presumably charge as much for access as a free
market will bear, thus making access available only to large business
or political organizations. Moreover, in an unregulated situation a cable
165 Notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. The Commission's "N +1" formula
(note 188 and accompanying text infra) seems designed partially to reach this infinite
channel capacity. But it falls far short. First, it guarantees at most that a user has a
chance of eventually paying for an allocation. Second, it seems doubtful that the FCC
would actually require a cable operator to expand his channel capacity indefinitely; after
the system's initial capacity has been reached, further expansion would require prohibitively expensive system rewiring.
168 Fourth Report and Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 8251, 3289 (1972).
167 See Burch Letter app. B.

168 New York City has a net weekly circulation of 5.5 million while San Francisco
has one of 1.4 million. 41 TELEVISION FAcraOOK: STATIONS VOLUME 56-a (1971).
169 Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 8905, 3912 (1952).
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operator might quite reasonably hesitate to risk the huge sums necessary
for expansion of capacity, and instead choose to maximize profits simply
by raising his prices. The free market approach would thus re-create
in microcosm the present broadcasting structure.
These problems can be ameliorated by partially restricting the
marketplace. First, rates could be subjected to regulation or at least
surveillance to prevent pricing potential users out of the access market.
Control of rates, however, is probably neither feasible nor efficient; and
even if it were, the hand responsible for control would have to be exceptionally deft. If rates were too high, channel capacity would go unused; if rates were too low, demand for allocations would be greater
than capacity would allow. Second, prices could be left to the marketplace with a guaranty of fair treatment for all potential customers. The
Commission, like many local regulators, 170 has attempted to do this by
simply requiring cable operators to make public their leasing rates and
to provide three separate channels-denominated access, educational,
and governmental-on a "first-come, nondiscriminatory basis." 171 This
type of solution is, of course, administratively attractive, since it effectively remits the whole problem to the cable operator. It is basically
inadequate, however, not only because it is an administrative default,
but also because it unrealistically assumes that such a requirement will
prevent the first served from becoming the only served. Finally, under
the Commission's plan channel leasing is left largely to the marketplace,
subject to the requirement that the cable operator provide the three
free channels and post the schedule of rates, This approach is little more,
however, than a sop to vocal minority interests. It gives no meaningful
right of access to commercial users, who may potentially develop the
most attractive new programming. And with noncommercial users it
still leaves unresolved the basic problem of passing upon competing demands for access.
There are, however, ways of structuring the marketplace to provide
for diversity, if not for access. Limiting a cable system's range of programming can make the marketplace favor diversity. The Commission's
antisiphoning rules already do this, although only incidentally. Programming restrictions can, however, be tailored deliberately to encourage diversity. First, a cable system or independent producer could be
allowed to offer a program, on either an advertiser or a pay basis, to only
a maximum number of subscribers. 172 In theory, this should make mass
170 See, e.g., BnrrER BROADCASTING COUNCIL, supra note 136, §§ 2.31-.32; JoNEs 132-33;
New York City Bd. of Estimate supra note 85, § 3.
171 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3289 (1972).
172 A similar approach has been proposed for common owners of television stations.
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appeal impossible and the kitsch factor unprofitable; however, it might
also increase the number of conventional programs, since each cable
system and producer would presumably still attempt to attract as much
as possible of the limited audience. Second, pay program charges could
be structured to encourage specialized programs by decreasing the cable
operator's permissible charges per subscriber as the number of viewers
increased: for example, $100,000 for the first 100,000 viewers, $75,000
for the next 100,000, and so forth. Although this might encourage a few
small producers, it would still leave mass appeal programs most profitable. Finally, access rates could be structured either to increase or decrease in proportion to a program producer's frequency of use. If rates
increased, occasional users would gain an advantage over more common
kitsch producers. If rates decreased, the cable operator would have an
incentive to carry specialized producers. Unless the variations were
extremely wide, however, mass appeal programs would still be most
profitable. Most importantly, all these approaches give the cable operator ultimate program control. While increasing diversity incrementally,
therefore, they would not effectively implement a right of access.
If even a somewhat tamed marketplace is unsatisfactory, the path
of least regulatory resistance might be to leave all access determinations
to the discretion of the appropriate level of government1 73 under a
general rubric such as the "public interest." Procedural safeguards
should prevent the most visible abuses, 17 4 even though probably few
access determinations would ever reach the courts for review. Such an
approach, however, would be an abdication of responsibility. The
closest analogy, of course, is the Commission's comparative licensing
procedure, which has been characterized by inefficiency, inconsistency,
vagueness, and undue influence. Such a system might be even more
disastrous for access determinations since it would probably be administered by a local, comparatively inexperienced agency and since potential users would have limited resources with which to contest access
determinations.
H. Levin, supra note 144, at 821. Alternatively, a cable operator might be required to
program multiple channels on the theory that by using mass appeal programming he
would only be competing with himself. This approach, however, would probably still encourage attempts to reach the largest audience possible on each channel.
173 See text accompanying notes 248-73 infra.
174 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis would presumably approve of such a delegation if
it contained sufficient procedural protection. 1 K. DAvis, ADmINrRATIvE LAW TEXr § 2.05,

at 37-38 (rev. ed. 1959). Moreover, it might be argued that access determinations present
what Professor Lon Fuller has termed "polycentric problems" and are therefore susceptible
only to political rather than adjudicative disposition. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule
of Law, 1960 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, 3-5.
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A third alternative, then, to either marketplace or administrative
regulation is adoption of a strict standard to govern who gets what and
how: a formula for access.
C.

A Formula for Access
1. Who

The Commission's requirement of three dedicated channels175 partially defines the "who" part of the access formula, since presumably
only educational and governmental interests may use the channels allocated to those uses. But the Commission has not indicated precisely
what educational and governmental mean, thus giving discretion once
again to the cable operator. In addition, the Commission's failure to
specify who may use the access channel makes all attempts at definition
of these terms meaningless, since a potential user could conceivably
qualify for all three channels. For example, a local school board might
be considered an educational user, a governmental user, or an access
user. While the Commission's intention may have been to make access
channels available to literally anyone, 176 this definitional vagueness complicates any access formula. The Commission may, in fact, have deliberately chosen an open-ended approach because of the administrative
difficulty in categorizing potential users. As the New York City experience has shown, strict qualifying standards may inhibit potential
users.'7 7 Definition is, however, not only possible, but also necessary to
ensure equitable bandwidth allocation. To facilitate the definitional
task, the Commission at least could have suggested some existing criteria
such as eligibility for tax exempt status or fourth class mailing privileges. Although these guidelines might be used to keep out some potential users and to justify veiled censorship, 178 they show that the problem
can be resolved.
Moreover, the channel dedication approach may be basically unsound, despite its general acceptance. First, it wastes resources if a
channel may not be used for other than its dedicated purpose. The
Commission has avoided this pitfall by allowing a cable operator to
lease or use for his own purposes any excess time on a dedicated chanText accompanying notes 170-71 supra.
Burch Letter 1772.
177 The New York City regulations, for example, require that a potential access user
give the cable operator a preview of his program and allow him to delete potentially
objectionable sections. In addition, they lay down a series of complicated procedures for
application, copyright clearance, and bonding. New York City Bureau of Franchises, Rules
Governing Access to Public Channels, June 29, 1971.
178 See note 238 and accompanying text infra.
175

176
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nel. 79 Second, and more important, the dedication approach puts noncommercial programming on a separate and inherently unequal footing.
Confined to discrete channels, noncommercial programming will probably be automatically ignored by most viewers, just as public broadcast
stations are today. Viewers develop very definite channel loyalties"1 0
and thus may completely avoid channels they do not normally watch.
A mix of commercial and noncommercial programming on each channel would create far more diversity. Accordingly, access must be apportioned between commercial and noncommercial users on the basis
of time periods rather than channels. Thus noncommercial users would
be entitled to a given percentage of a system's total prime and nonprime time, rather than one or more separate channels. This system
might complicate viewers' lives somewhat by requiring more channel
switching, but that seems to be a social cost well worth bearing.
Finally, though noncommercial groups have attracted the greatest
attention, some commercial organizations also require access. Small
businesses need an outlet for local low cost advertising. 81 Giving the
cable operator total control over commercial channel leasing might
result in discrimination in favor of large commercial interests and long
term leasing by large businesses. Instead, commercial interests should
have an enforceable right of access, albeit on terms profitable to the
cable operator. The Commission has now clarified some of the ambiguity in its prior letter of intent and now requires that commercial users
82
receive "first-come, nondiscriminatory" access.
2. What
The "what" part of the access formula is even more complex than
the "who" part, since it involves many intangible factors which cannot
be identified, let alone quantified. 83 Television viewers usually have
170 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 8251, 3289 (1972).
180 See note 184 and accompanying text infra.
181 See US. DEP'r oF JusncE, CommEws, FCC Docket No. 18397, at 9-11 (1969). A

requirement that commercial as well as noncommercial users be given access creates its
own definitional problems since it is often difficult to distinguish the two. An initial
difficulty arises in deciding whether the factor relevant in categorizing a user is the nature
of the user, the nature of the use, or both. Thus, a non-profit corporation might produce
programs whose sole aim was to raise money; conversely, a business corporation might
finance purely informational programs.
182 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 8289 (1972). On the one hand, the
Burch Letter spoke of nondiscriminatory access on leased channels. Burch Letter 1776.
On the other hand, the Commission also stated that cable operators "may make available
for leased uses" excess channel capacity. Id. at 1772. The Fourth Report and Order solves
the problem, however, by providing that operators "shall offer" leased channels and by
requiring fair treatment. 87 Fed. Reg. at 8289.
18S L. JoHlsoN, supra note 152, at 58.
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loyalties to particular stations"s which might persist even in a "wired
nation"; the person who has watched channel four for twenty years may
still prefer it, even if it changes programming and becomes only one of
forty channels.18 5 Similarly, even viewers without confirmed viewing
habits may find some channel's programming particularly attractive
and thus develop a new set of loyalties, though perhaps not so strong
as those of contemporary viewers with only a limited choice of channels.
In addition, specialized programming may increase the attractiveness
of adjacent programs, an intangible factor with which the Commission
has never really come to grips; 8 6 a viewer content with one or more
channels may have little incentive to switch through forty others in
search of more interesting programming. As a result, a program's exposure may well become increasingly dependent on the time and channel allocated to it, a factor which the "what" portion of any access
formula must take into account.
The Commission's "first-come, nondiscriminatory" standard totally
ignores these considerations. Even if it is fairly administered by cable
operators, 8 7 which seems doubtful, the standard does not guarantee to
a potential user an allocation with a significant audience. Moreover, it
may not guarantee any allocation at all, since the Commission does not
seem to contemplate preventing first comers from serving theniselves
with all desirable allocations by means of long term and large scale
booking. If the Commision does, however, interpret its formulation as
incorporating some notions of equity, it will have created a complex
doctrine and a catalog of administrative difficulties.
The Commission's "N + 1" formula8 8 will do little to dispel the
uncertainty. It will require a cable operator to add a new channel to his
system within six months of the time that all his channels are "in use
during 80 percent of the weekdays (Monday-Friday), for 80 percent of
the time during any consecutive 3-hour period for 6 consecutive
weeks."'8 9 This approach may prove self-defeating, however, since it
184 Even the Supreme Court recognized the value of "confirmed habits of listeners
and viewers" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US. 367, 400 (1969).
185 One prerequisite to meaningful access is "equal dial accessability," that is, selection

of all channels through the use of one tuning mechanism, rather than the two separate
knobs necessary for contemporary VHF and UHF reception. Note, supra note 46, at 538-39.
Though such a difference may seem minimally important, it is psychologically significant

since it segregates new channels from established ones.
186 According to one commentator, specialized programming may have the desirable
side effect of creating "a new prime time." Note, supra note 46, at 545 n.71.
187 See, e.g., note 239 infra.
188 Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3289 (1972). "N + 1" means that
the cable operator would be required to add one channel to his current number, "N."
189 Id.
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gives a cable operator a built-in incentive to stay below the magic figures-which should be easy enough. Moreover, even if workable, the
formula ignores the intangible factors discussed above; it ensures only
that a potential user ultimately gets an allocation, but not that it is a
meaningful one. Finally, it gives a potential user only a leased rather
than a free channel.19 0
The "what" part of the access formula therefore needs further
development. It is now feasible to quantify the intangibles to some extent and thus to develop a theory with at least limited validity. Although judging a program's merits is constitutionally suspect and
pragmatically unsound, 19' it is relatively easy to predict the exposure
value of a particular allocation. Each allocation can be assigned an
"attractiveness index," by finding each allocation's audience share, as
the Commission has done in determining distant signals.192 Each allocation would then have a definite value. The eventual development of
limited two-way communications 9 3 would make such measurements
less expensive and more valid than today, since viewers' choices could
be continually monitored.

94

Expanding the "what" part of the formula complicates the "who"
part, since both politics and equity require some reasonable relation
between users' needs and the benefits of allocations. There must therefore be some priority among users to resolve multiple demands for the
same allocation. Such an approach is politically perilous and the Commission has accordingly shrunk from it. It can be implemented, however, upon comparatively neutral principles.
Where there are no multiple demands for the same allocation, as
is likely to be the case in the foreseeable future, 195 the user may be given
whatever time and channel he requests. Though perhaps a misallocation
190 Note 182 supra.
191 But see Note, Television Programs, Communication Research, and the FCC, 23
U. Prrr. L. REv. 993, 997-98 (1962).
102 See note 3 supra.
193 See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
194 See N. FElDMAN, supra note 113, at 23. Many articles in the popular press have
depicted such monitoring as an invasion of privacy. Though CATV does have a capability
for intense surveillance of personal life, 1984 (a date which, as many have noted, will
mark the fiftieth anniversary of the FCC) is not around the corner. Such monitoring, of
course, should be optional with the subscriber, perhaps in return for a fee rebate. See
Note, supra note 46, at 540. More important, since the turn of the century we have somehow managed to live with the ordinary telephone, which has presented opportunities for
at least audio surveillance.
195 There will presumably be a considerable time lag between the date at which
access channels become available and the date at which they become used extensively, as
the New York City experience has shown. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 83, col. 1; id.,
July 2, 1971, at 67, col. 4. See note 177 supra.
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of resources, this freedom does little violence to the interest of either
the public or the user; moreover, it follows the Commission's practice of
summarily granting unopposed applications for far more valuable and
permanent spectrum allocations. 19
Where there are multiple demands for the same allocation, though,
the access formula must give priority to a timely application 97 by the
potential user with the greatest need. Determination of this need, however, should not be based on inherently subjective, and thus constitutionally objectionable, evaluations of the users' motivation and message.
Instead, it can be grounded on a reasonably objective comparison of the
competing applicants' abilities to gain public attention. First, potential
users can be classified within commercial and noncommercial categories
based on their ability to gain public attention. Commercial users could
be classified according to their gross receipts into as many different
groups as seem reasonable. Second, when there is a conflict between
two potential users, commercial or noncommercial, within the same
category, an access determination can be made by comparing three
factors: (1) each user's gross receipts; 198 (2) each user's previous medium
expenditures and exposure; 19 9 and (3) each user's amortized previous
70, at 200.
197 Some outer cutoff date for filing is necessary to prevent a user from expecting an
allocation, making expenditures in reliance, and then suddenly losing it to a higher
priority user. Allocations could be reserved for users who, because of emergency needs,
meet the priority but not the filing requirements; such allocations could also be distributed
under the system of preferences outlined in notes 198-200 and accompanying text infra.
198 The gross receipts standard does create a potential element of unfairness, since two
organizations could conceivably have identical gross receipts but differing amounts of
money available for medium purposes. On the other hand, any other standard would
require a time consuming examination of whether each organization had allocated its
receipts in a reasonable fashion, an issue impossible of exact resolution.
As an alternative standard, the number of a non-profit organization's members and of
a business organization's customers might be relevant. But this standard would create considerable difficulty in defining "member" and "customer"; moreover, it would be inappropriate for organizations such as legal service offices which have prospective beneficiaries rather than members.
199 Expenditures would, of course, be measured simply in terms of out of pocket
expense. Exposure, on the other hand, would be measured in terms of fair market value,
that is, what an advertiser would have paid for the equivalent amount of exposure. For
commercial users, the exposure standard will often be almost the same as the expenditure
standard, since most business organizations have to advertise in order to gain exposure.
Use of both standards is, however, necessary.
The exposure standard creates the possibility of inaccurate measurement, since all
exposure is by no means favorable. Conversely, it would be pragmatically impossible and
constitutionally questionable to judge whether a given exposure were favorable or unfavorable. It might be feasible, however, to exclude from the exposure measurement all
comments explicitly labeled as editorial, since advertisers generally cannot buy, at least
directly, editorial comment.
196 See W. JONEs, supra note
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use of access allocations. 20 0 Although this system lacks mathematical
certainty, its factors lend themselves to fast and accurate proof.20 1
The use of quantifiable preferences would also facilitate resolution
of complex situations such as requests for overlapping allocations and
proposed repeat programming. 20 2 In the somewhat unlikely case of a
tie, the allocation decision could be made by the time-honored regulatory technique of flipping a coin.
This system of comparison admittedly does not take into account
a host of relevant but intangible factors such as the prestige of the organizations, their reputation in the community, and the like. Although
such considerations cannot be sufficiently quantified for the relatively
objective, swift, and simple decisions required, they will be reflected to
a large extent in the objective criteria used. 203 More importantly, the
exclusion of relevant but intangible factors permits making an allocation decision without the subjectivity and delay which have character2 04
ized the Commission's comparative license proceedings.
200 Measuring the value of previous access allocations would be simple, since each
allocation will presumably be subject to continuous monitoring. Note 194 supra. Each
allocation's "life," the length of time for which the average viewer will remember the
average program, must be "amortized" to avoid crediting a user with programming which
lacks any current audience impact. No definitive study of program retention appears to
exist, however.
201 Gross receipts for both non-profit and business corporations can be obtained by
requiring surrender of their most current tax returns. Previous medium expenditures cannot be documented quite so effectively, but a competing user's ability to discover, by legal
process if necessary, the billing records and rate cards of the various media should keep
the process reasonably honest. Similarly, instances of previous medium exposure can be
uncovered easily by means of newspaper records and broadcasting logs; the value of each
exposure can be readily determined by consulting the appropriate rate card. Information
on previous access use will already be in the possession of the cable operator and regulatory
agency and will require only proper amortization.
The user with the least prior access and current ability to secure access will receive
priority. For example, organization A with (1) $200,000 gross receipts, (2) previous medium
expenditures and exposure worth $100,000, and (3) previous access use worth 200 points
(as measured by the "attractiveness index") might apply for an allocation also requested
by organization B, with (1) $100,000 gross receipts, (2) previous medium expenditures and
exposure worth $150,000, and (3) previous access use worth 200 points. In such a case, B
would have a preference of 50% on criterion (1), A would have a preference of 66% on
criterion (2), and neither would have any preference on criterion (3), thus giving final
priority to A.
202 Where one user requests only part of the time desired by another user, the necessary preference can be decreased proportionately. Similarly, where a user desires to show a
repeat program, his preference can be decreased by the unamortized life of the program.
203 Thus old, established, and prestigious organizations generally will have higher
gross receipts and receive more gratuitous medium exposure than newer groups.
204 See R. ANTHONY, supra note 66. Professor Anthony proposes simplifying compara-
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There are, of course, ways of beating this system. A group might
deliberately fragment itself into small organizations to receive a higher
priority in each category. In recent years, however, the courts have
found no great difficulty in distinguishing "dummy" from bona fide
corporations. More commonly, dissident members of an existing group
might be encouraged to split off into a new organization by the promise
of access allocations. In a pluralistic society this need not be considered
an evil. A group might also deliberately restrict its medium exposures,
advertising expenditures, and access use to create priority for itself in
the future. This is, however, a matter of individual election and is already practiced today in budgetary planning.
The neutral and somewhat mechanical nature of this system, however, may create some unfortunate side effects. Splinter groups may consistently gain priority over more affluent groups which have a message
many people consider important. This deficiency can be treated in
two ways. The formula might contain a discretionary "fudge" factor
for the administrator. Or the formula's criteria could be treated simply
as guidelines rather than as standards. In practical effect, these two
alternatives would operate identically. Adoption of either alternative,
however, would remove the certainty and predictability which are the
primary virtues of an objective test.
The best means for handling access determinations may in fact be
to combine the marketplace, administrative, and formula approaches,
since none seems adequate by itself. Thus, a "first-come, first-served"
marketplace scheme would govern unless there were conflicting demands from potential users within the same category. In the event of
such a conflict, the appropriate agency would resolve the issue under the
criteria outlined above. Though this approach ensures neither absolute
justice nor absolute ease of application, it accommodates both.
Finally, there is the question of whether the fairness doctrine
should be retained under a formula for access. On the one hand, failure
to require fairness would force a replying group to wait until it had
sufficient priority for a given allocation. On the other hand, traditional
arguments for fairness are weakened by a guaranty of access, since any
group can plan for possible future needs. On balance, there seems to
be little real reason for applying to cable a doctrine which both the
205
broadcasters and the Commission have found unsatisfactory.
tive licensing proceedings by means quite similar in nature to those outlined above. Id.
at 61-77.
205 The so-called "Whitehead Doctrine," named for the Director of the Office of
Telecommunications Policy, proposed to do away with tie fairness doctrine and substitute
for it a rather ill-defined right of paid access. Director Whitehead appeared somewhat less
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This combination of marketplace, administrative, and formula
regulation is by no means perfect. Politics and the problems inherent

in administering the system make a certain amount of inefficiency unavoidable. It is more valid than the Commission's race notice plan,
however, and at worst would be no more irrational than the Commis20 6
sion's current system of allocating spectrum space.
To obtain genuinely meaningful access, however, potential users
will need production facilities as well as allocations; access is obviously
useless without the ability to produce attractive programming. Many
observers have proposed that the cable operator be required to provide
production facilities, 20 7 and the Commission has at least made a gesture
towards supplying access to such facilities. 2 8 There is no consensus, however, as to the extent of the cable operator's responsibilities. 209
Moreover, it is unclear whether production facilities should be provided
free, at cost, or on a partially subsidized basis. The appropriate solution
might be to subsidize separate production facilities, 2 10 rather than to
place a vague and unenforceable burden on the cable operator.
3. How
a. Financial Terms of Access. The final part of the formula is
the "how": the financial terms of access. Commercial users should, of
concerned, however, with facilitating public use of broadcasting. In attacking the fairness
doctrine he noted that
[o]nce the public discovered its opportunity to participate in the commission's
processes it became inevitable that the rusty tools of program content controllicense renewal and the fairness doctrine-would be taken from the FCC's hands
and used by the public and the courts to make you perform to their idea of the
public interest.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 11, 1971, at 14 [emphasis in original]. Director Whitehead obviously has
a rather novel conception of the public interest. The Commission has apparently decided
for the moment not to apply the fairness doctrine to either free or leased channels. See
Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3288 (1972).
208 See Johnson, Towers of Babel: The Chaos in Radio Spectrum Utilization and
Allocation, 34 LAw 8: CoNramsP. PROB. 505 (1969).
207 See, e.g., ACLU, Civil Liberties Requirements for the Regulation of Broadband
Cable Systems for Television and Other Communications Content Services, in CosmENcrs
ON PROPOSED

RUI.EMAIUNG: FEDERAL-STATE

REGULATORY

RELATIONSHIPS,

FCC Docket No.

18892 (1970); N. FELDMAN, supra note 118, at 21; Note, supra note 46, at 541.
208 See Fourth Report and Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 8251, 8289 (1972).
209 For an illustration of the complexity inherent in setting strict requirements as to
amount and type of production equipment, see the discussion in Note, supra note 46,
at 541-42.
210 One major public television spokesman, in fact, suggested that the Commission
apply its proposed 5% "public dividend" to subsidizing production of public interest
programming on CATV. Statement of Hartford N. Gunn, President, Public Broadcasting
Service, Before the Sloan Comn'n on Cable Television, Dec. 17, 1970, on file at the
Cornell Law Review.
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course, pay for allocations, since they will presumably profit from the
exposure. Moreover, expansion of channel capacity is expensive, and to
attract venture capital the cable operator must receive a substantial
return on commercial channel leasing. Entrusting the cable operator's
charges to the marketplace, however, risks freezing out small producers
and advertisers. 211 At the same time, extensive rate regulation is not
only inappropriate but also not feasible. 212 As a compromise between
these two extremes, the cable operator might be required to publish
nondiscriminatory rates, subject to adjustment by the appropriate administrative body.213
Noncommercial users must also be encouraged, although their use
will not result in a profit to the cable operator. There appear to be only
three methods of financing noncommercial users, each of which has
distinct drawbacks. First, noncommercial users could simply receive
access for free. Although this would obviously be preferable to broadcasting's high charges, the cable operator would just pass the cost on to
subscribers.2 14 Second, noncommercial users could pay only the cost of
using the cable system's facilities. Although these charges should, in
theory, be low enough to discourage only a few potential users, the
complexity of rate regulation makes this approach not feasible. Third,
users and subscribers could share the cost.2 1 5 Though this approach
somewhat mitigates the unfairness of the first alternative, it also shares
the rate-making problems of the second.
No obvious solution to the problem of financing noncommercial
users has emerged. The Commission's adoption of the first alternative 21 e
is probably owing more to discretion than valor. From its experience
in regulating common carriers, the Commission presumably knows all
too well the pitfalls of rate regulation and thus is anxious to avoid them
at almost any cost-that is, cost to the subscriber. Though economically
211 See text accompanying notes 169-70 supra.
212 See notes 170-72 and accompanying text supra.
213 Although the Commission has not adopted a full scale rate surveillance procedure,
it does require cable operators to adopt rules for leased channels "specifying an appropriate rate schedule." Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3289 (1972).
214 See Coase, The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy, 56 Am. ECON.

REv. 440, 446 (1966).
215 The Better Broadcasting Council would make the user's cost equal to the
amount paid by all subscribers for maintaining the cable system for the time period used.
BMrrn BROADCASTING COuNCIL, supra note 136, at § 2.4.
216 The Commission now requires that the public access channel be made available
for free and that the educational and governmental channels be provided for free "until
five (5) years after completion of the system's basic trunk line." Fourth Report and Order,
37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3289 (1972).
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inequitable, this method may well be the only realistic administrative
alternative.
b. The Rate-Making Thicket. Although regulation of subscription and use rates poses a host of practical problems, there appears to
be no legal bar to it. CATV is an inherent monopoly 217 and usually has
government sanction through an exclusive franchise. As such, it meets
traditional definitions of a public utility2 18 and is affected with a public
interest. 219 Cable operators have always been opposed to public utility
regulation, 220 however, and few states have imposed it.221 Commentators
222
and courts are about equally divided on the question.
Assuming that the FCC, 23 state governments, or local authorities
have the power and inclination to regulate rates, creating a proper rate
base may prove extremely difficult. Appropriate cable rate base com217 See Barnett, supra note 121, at 240-41; Barnett & Greenberg, supra note 21, at 572;
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, supra note 181, at 5.
218 CATV holds its service out to the public, is a monopoly, and usually has an exclusive franchise. E. CLEMENs, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 21-34 (1950); 1 A. PiRasr,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 10-13 (1969).
219 The traditional test of "affected with a public interest" is that one who uses
his property in such a way as to affect the public, grants the public an interest in that
use, and to that extent submits to public control for the common good. Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1877). It should be remembered, however, that the businesses involved in
that case held no form of exclusive franchise but were, at least theoretically, in competition with each other. A cable system, on the other hand, has at least a de facto monopoly
simply because of the prohibitive costs of laying cable. Moreover, in some subdivisions a
developer will contract for cable service and at the same time prohibit use of rooftop
antennas, thus making subscription a necessity. See Witt, CATY and Local Regulation, 5
CALIF. W.L. REv. 80, 39 (1968). Finally, the Supreme Court has been increasingly liberal
in its definition of "affected." In Olsen v. Nebraska, 818 U.S. 236, 244-46 (1941), the
Court announced a "drift away" from its older, more stringent standards and held that a
state could regulate the rates of an employment agency, a business certainly having far
less exclusive control over the public than a cable system.
220 See Note, supra note 21, at 373.
221 See Botein, supra note 72, at 821-24. The new regulations, however, require that
initial rates be approved by the franchising body and that subsequent rate increases be
allowed only after a public hearing. 87 Fed. Reg. at 3281.
222 Botein, supra note 72, at 822, n.33.
223 It is not entirely certain that the FCC has the statutory power to regulate cable
rates, even if it chooses to do so. The basis for the Commission's jurisdiction over CATV is
less than dear. Text accompanying notes 248-56 infra. If the Commission were held to
have jurisdiction over CATV as a common carrier under Title H of the Communications
Act, 47 US.C. §§ 201-23 (1970), it presumably could exercise its traditional common
carrier rate making power. On the other hand, if CATV is considered to be within Title
I of the Act (id. §§ 801-99), the Commission probably could not. In National Ass'n of
Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 897 US. 922 (1970),
the court upheld the Commission's power to authorize subscription television, but noted
in dictum that whether the Commission could set rates was a "difficult question."
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ponents and valuation techniques have not yet been developed. 22 4 Construction and maintenance costs vary significantly at this comparatively
early stage of the medium's development.225 Moreover, the initial in-

vestment is large, owing to the high cost of laying wire, 226 while the
initial profits are small. Conversely, subsequent investments are likely
to be small and subsequent profits likely to be large. 227 Cable system
depreciation rates are still unsettled 228 and are likely to remain so because of unpredictable needs for extensive system rebuilding.229 Moreover, much of a system's value is its franchise, which, if depreciable at
all,23 0 may not be subject to exact valuation. 23 1 These difficulties are

compounded by the unavailability of alternative means of measuring
rate of return 23 2 since no comparable service exists as an economic yardstick.
Establishing an appropriate rate base, however, is only the threshold problem in CATV rate regulation. Though perhaps adequate for
subscriber rates, a conventional rate base is of little help in determining user rates, since different classes of users require different rates.
Although common carrier regulation has traditionally set class rates, the
224 In New York State, for example, local franchising authorities use a variety of
different methods for setting subscription rates. JONES 128-30.
225 See Ohs, MarginalCost Pricing,Investment Theory and CATM, 13 J. LAw & EcoN.

439, 441-42 (1970).
226 At least one state commission has recognized this problem. To finance the initial
cost of constructing the system, Wyoming allowed a cable system to exact initial installation charges, returnable at a future date, higher than would otherwise have been
allowed. Rawlins Community Antenna Television Co., 12 P.U.R.Sd 214, 216-17 (Wyo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956); accord, Albert M. Carollo, 13 P.U.R.Sd 581 (Wyo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1956).
227 In 1965 Dr. Martin Seiden reported an average cable system profit margin of 57%.
M. SEmEN, supra note 141, at 27. Though his study is now a bit dated, it is probably still
valid since William K. Jones came up with 56.7%-almost the identical figure-for New
York State cable systems. W. JONS, supra note 19, at 162.
228 See PL POSNER, supra note 152, at 28; Taylor, The Case for State Regulation of
CATV Distribution Systems, 23 FED. Com. B.J. 110, 118 (1969).
229 Thus the Commission's newly adopted requirement of minimum channel capacity
(see note 166 and accompanying text supra) might require extensive system rewiring for
some operators.
230 The value of a franchise is generally not depreciable, because it represents the
monopoly position conferred on a public utility by law. E. CL.NS, supra note 218, at
169. This would, however, not be true for the few unfranchised cable systems.
231 A cable franchise was held not depreciable for tax purposes, since there was a
substantial likelihood that it would be renewed, in Toledo TV Cable Co., 55 T.C. 1107
(1971).
232 See F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PuBLic UTIIATY REGULATiON 250-53 (rev. ed.

1968).
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process has been difficult and often unsatisfactory. 2 3 As a result, CATV
rate regulation is probably inefficient at best and unworkable at worst.234
Even if feasible, however, rate regulation may be strategically unwise.
Compared to other media, CATV is a comparatively high risk business2s 5 and needs massive infusions of venture capital. This funding
will not be forthcoming if CATV's future promises only a conventional
public utility return. Thus CATV must initially earn large and perhaps
even exorbitant profits to develop the subscriber penetration and channel capacity necessary for access. 236 The most sensible regulatory tactic
might therefore be to allow almost unlimited profits at first and then
to impose strict rate regulation after cable has fully developed.
D.

Control of Access Content

Although access regulation is essential, conventional common carrier regulation would thus be inappropriate. 23 7 Nevertheless, if access
is to be meaningful the cable operator must be barred from controlling
program content. Allowing the operator to act as a censor would frus238
trate access regulation and also probably violate the first amendment.
233 See E. CLEmENS, supra note 218, at 285-86, 291-93, 358; A. PPtsT, supra note 218,
at 295-96, 340-42. Setting rates for the use of production facilities would be even more
difficult, since it might require establishing a different rate for each piece of equipment.
Compare the optimism in Note, supra note 46, at 543.
234 R. POSNER, supra note 152, at 80-33. The Canadian Radio-Television Commission
has taken supervisory jurisdiction over rates charged to CATV subscribers, but apparently
has not acted to reduce any rates. See Hearings,supra note 7, at 291.
235 Although broadcasting activities usually generate a considerably higher profit
than other activities of conglomerate corporations (see BROADCASNG, Aug. 2, 1971, at 1421), CATV's viability is much less secure than traditional broadcasting's.
236 See JoNES 122-23, 183. Moreover, there may well be some relation between the
amount of capital and the quality of programming. Thus to encourage venture capital
the Canadian Radio-Television Commission has decided to grant cable systems licenses
for the maximum statutory period. CANADUN RADio-TELEViSION COMW'N, Policy Statement
on Cable-Television, in CAbDL TELEvsioN IN CANADA 31-32 (1971).

23T It is somewhat anomalous to find a commentator who fully recognizes the need
for venture capital urging common carrier treatment for CATV. JoNEs 199.
238 Cable systems may be sufficiently entangled in the regulatory process, especially
if subject to access requirements, for their operators' actions to constitute state action.
Mr. Justice Douglas has equated government licensing with state action. See Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 US. 369, 384-85 (1967) (concurring opinion); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 US.
267, 281-83 (1963) (concurring opinion); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 182-84 (1961)
(concurring opinion). More recently, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a television
station was so sufficiently intertwined with the federal regulatory process as to make
its actions state action. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971). But the Ninth Circuit has refused to equate a telephone company's conduct with state action. Martin v. Pacific N.W. Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Although the Commission has taken nominal steps to oust cable
operators from program control, 23 9 it is also concerned with protecting
2 40
subscribers from involuntary exposure to offensive programming.
It has even proposed requiring the cable operator to provide subscribers
with a locking switch "should parents wish to control their children's
viewing." 241 This type of thinking is as misguided as it is futile. It is
hardly the Commission's province to guard people against the consequences of their deliberate choice to subscribe to CATV. The impossibility of adequately fashioning such protection ensures that the Commission will do nothing more than assume a politically expedient
posture of concern.
Cable operators are quite naturally somewhat less than willing to
relinquish program content control. They predictably raise the spectre
of possible criminal and civil liability for uncontrolled cablecast utterances or acts by judgment-proof users.242 These fears are largely unfounded. The very lack of control which so distresses the cable operators
should also immunize them from liability. A user's acts are unlikely to
be characterized as criminal, in light of the courts' tight restrictions on
prosecutions for incitement to riot, criminal anarchy, and the like. 243
Even where a user's speech is not protected, the cable operator would
presumably not have the constitutionally required specific intent.2 44
Similarly, the possibility of civil actions for defamation seems extremely
remote in light of the Supreme Court's recent extension of first amendment protection to all speech involving "a subject of public or general
239 The new regulations require that a cable system "shall exercise no control over
program content" on access or leased channels, but they also require cable systems to
promulgate rules barring obscene and other materials. 37 Fed. Reg. at 3289. By thus
encouraging program previewing, the new regulations invite abuse of discretion.
240 Burch Letter 1775.

241 Id.; see also Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. Ray.

1008, 1034 (1971).
242 A simple means of protecting the cable operator would be to require that a user
post a bond as a prerequisite to obtaining access. In light of the damages usually requested in defamation actions, however, such a bond would have to be rather substantial
and thus quite expensive for the user, whether he supplied it directly or employed a cornmerial bonding firm. Moreover, unless the amount of the bond were limited, it would
allow the cable operator to make the price of access prohibitive. As a result, a bonding
system seems inappropriate. If any security is needed, self-insurance by the cable operators
would be more efficient.
243 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), for example, the Supreme Court
held that a state criminal syndicalism statute could not be applied absent proof that the
speech involved was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [was]
likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
244 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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interest. '245 It would be difficult to impute actual malice to a, cable
operator who lacked control over and knowledge of a program's content. 24 6 Even if a cable operator could be held liable, federal access regulations might well preempt a state court judgment.2 7 Finally, whatever
minimal risk of liability might remain could be covered easily and inexpensively by self-insurance. The nature of the risk is now sufficiently
speculative to make insurance either unobtainable or prohibitively expensive. After the initial shakedown period, however, the risk should
turn out to be relatively low and predictable and the insurance comparatively inexpensive.
In reality, cable operators are probably more concerned about
losing viewers than lawsuits. But this is hardly a paramount regulatory
concern. It neither outweighs nor justifies the danger of censorship.
E.

Jurisdiction to Enforce Access

Assuming then that access regulation is workable, the final problem is to determine what governmental entities have the authority and
ability to impose it. Although the FCC's general jurisdiction over

CATV is now fairly well settled, it is not yet entirely clear whether it
is plenary, since every court to pass on the issue has come up with its
own distinctive analysis.2 48 Indeed, in United States v. Southwestern
245 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). The plaintiff had attempted to recover for allegedly defamatory broadcasts concerning a police campaign
against his nudist magazines.
246 One possible exception might be what has become known as the "second bite of
the apple," a situation in which an operator gives an allocation to a user who has already
engaged in criminally or civilly proscribed conduct on an access channel or other medium.
The difficulty here is in defining the "first bite." Must it have resulted in the mere commencement of an action or in a judgment? How closely related in time to an access
allocation request must it be? How related must the subject matter be? How substantial
must the damages have been? Without a clear and understandable resolution of these
questions, the cable operator will be in a very legitimate quandary, which he will quite
reasonably respond to by barring all users who seem even colorably tainted. To avoid
this result, the courts would probably be hesitant to hold that a user's past conduct is
sufficient to impute knowledge of his proposed statement to the CATV operator.
247 See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
248 This confusion is partially owing to the FcC's own pronouncements about its
jurisdiction. When it promulgated the 1966 set of regulations (Second Report and Order,
2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966)), the Commission developed a two-stage argument. It maintained
that the statement in 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970) that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall

apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio" gave it jurisdiction
over CATV. It then argued that other provisions in the Act empowered it to make regulations. 2 F.C.C.2d at 793-97. This approach had some obvious conceptual drawbacks, since
notions of jurisdiction and rule-making power are so intertwined that their severance
inevitably leaves loose ends dangling.
Thus, in Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 887 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court
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Cable Co.,249 the Supreme Court refused to pass on the validity of the

1966 regulations. Instead, it held that "the authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) [the statutory section partially relied upon by
the FCC for its jurisdiction] is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities
for the regulation of television broadcasting. '25" This language has been
interpreted in a number of ways. Some observers see it as a blanket
grant of power to the Commission, 251 while others have read it as
authorizing the Commission only to regulate CATV's impact on broadcasting.252 Most recently, the Eighth Circuit chose the latter interpretation. In Midwest Video Corp. v. United States,253 the court invalidated
the Commission's origination requirement on the ground that it had
no relation to the protection of broadcasting. This reasoning would
presumably bar the Commission from adopting an access formula, since
that would directly aid potential users rather than broadcasters. Such
a result, however, is not only unrealistic, but also at odds with the reasoning of Southwestern. Despite its "reasonably ancillary" language,
the Supreme Court based its decision on "the language of § 152(a).1 254
Though the Court may have violated both the letter and spirit of section 152(a) in doing so,255 adherence to this approach would nonetheless
give the Commission plenary jurisdiction over CATV. Moreover, a
upheld the Commission's jurisdiction on the ground that the goal of a national communications policy would be frustrated if the Commission could not regulate CATV. Id.
at 224-25. Though it briefly mentioned the Commission's rationale (id. at 223), it did not
analyze or adopt it. Conversely, in striking down the 1966 regulations in Southwestern
Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the
Ninth Circuit concerned itself only with the Commission's rule-making power, without
ever discussing whether section 152(a) was an effective grant of jurisdiction. See note
249 infra.
249 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In fact, the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction over CATV
may never really have been properly before the Court. The Ninth Circuit's decision may
be viewed as based solely on the ground that the FCC lacked statutory power to issue
the particular type of order in question. 378 F.2d at 124. The Supreme Court recognized
this possibility, but nevertheless went on to decide the broader issue of jurisdiction. 392
U.S. at 161 n.6.
250 392 U.S. at 178.
251 See, e.g., DE'T OF JusTicE, supra note 181, at 11; Botein, supra note 7, at 251.
252 E.g., JoNES 123; Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television, 70 CoLur.
L. Rav. 837, 859-60 (1970).
253 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 92 Sup. Ct. 676 (1972).
2S4 392 U.S. at 172. See note 248 & text accompanying note 250 supra.
255 First, the context of the section indicates that it was probably conceived of as a
safeguard against regulation of intrastate communication by the Commission. Second, this
interpretation of section 152(a) would make section 301, which empowers the Commission
to license broadcasters, redundant.
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Court so strongly committed to encouraging diversity26 may well
hesitate before striking down attempts to promote access.
If CATV were treated as a common carrier under Title II of the
Communications Act,257 the FCC could, of course, exercise its traditional power to regulate rates and practices. For years, however, the
Commission has held that CATV is not a common carrier, 25 8 and the
holding has received judicial approval. 259 This approach may be due for
a change, however, since CATV has changed-and would change further under an access formula-from a relayer of broadcast signals to a
26 0
medium controlled by viewer and user.
The FCC probably has the authority to require access to CATV.
Whether it has the inclination to do so, however, is a totally different
and far more questionable proposition; so far, the Commission has
painted access into its regulatory picture with only the broadest of
20
strokes. '
Although the Commission presumably can preempt state and local
authorities, 26 2 it has been loath to accept such a role 26 3 and has recently
admitted that it was "without any overall plan" for parceling out federal, state, and local regulatory responsibilities. 2 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has sanctioned, although somewhat ambiguously, state
and local cable regulation. 265 As a result, state and local authorities are
free to invoke their respective police and franchise powers26 6 to regulate
256 See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
257 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(b), 222(a) (1970).
258 Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959). This ruling was made, however,
at the time when the FCC was attempting to avoid taking jurisdiction over CATV.
259 Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
260 Verrill, CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or Common Carrier?, 34 LAw &
CoNTEMp. PROB. 586, 607-08 (1969).
261 See, e.g., Fourth Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3269-72 (1972).
262 See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida
Lime &.Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
268 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 Fed. Reg. 19028, 19031 (1968). In fact, the

Commission seems to be reluctant to exercise its authority to impose affirmative requirements relating to cable regulation directly on state and local governments. Rather than
deliberately imposing any direct obligations on state and local governments, it has attempted to achieve the same result indirectly by requiring a cable system to certify that its
local franchise meets certain minimum standards. The new regulations do not impose
minimum franchise requirements directly on local governments; rather, they provide
that a cable system's use of broadcast signals will not be approved absent such requirements. 37 Fed. Reg. at 3281.
264 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11044 (1970). But see Fourth Report
and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3281 (1972).
265 In TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970), the Court issued a per curiam
no opinion affirmance of a three-judge district court's decision that a state could regulate
aspects of CATV not preempted by the Commission.
266 Botein, supra note 72, at 817-23.
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access. The real problem in defining state and local roles is political
rather than legal. Many local governments have franchised cable systems
2 8
for a long time267 and have no desire to lose either power or revenue. 1
Divesting a local government of its authority would thus generate formidable political opposition. But joint state and local regulation, as
proposed in several states,20 9 would create a three-tiered bureaucracy.
Access can, however, be split off from other CATV regulatory issues and administered by a separate body. Continuous surveillance is
necessary even with federal standards, since even the most precise access
formula requires interpretation and application. Moreover, an access
formula must be administered quickly, since both allocations and users'
needs are transistory in nature. A local regulatory body might well be
most appropriate.2 70 Entrusting such politically sensitive issues to a local
agency inevitably creates a risk of undue influence, 27 1 no matter how
much insulation is provided. 272 The political value of access, however,
makes some risks inevitable, and these risks may be a reasonable price
for speed. Moreover, making a local body's action reviewable before
state courts and perhaps the FCC2 T
7 should keep it fairly honest.
The final problem raised by access regulation is the first amendment. Although the Supreme Court has dispelled any lingering illusions
27 4 it
that broadcast regulation is not subject to the first amendment,
still embraces the "scarcity doctrine"-the notion that broadcasting may
267 Although there are no figures on unfranchised cable systems, the number is
presumably very small since a local government has an obvious economic and regulatory
incentive to require a franchise. In fact, most unfranchised systems are probably the
product of rare cases in which state courts have held local governments without power to
require a franchise of a CATV using leased telephone company cables. See id. at 820-21.
28 Id. at 819. Though most fees seem to run around 5% to 67 (JoNES 127), some
have been known to be as high as 37%. Anthony, A Regulator Looks at State CATV
Regulation, 82 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 5, 1968, at 30.
269 E.g., (1971) Ill.
Sen. Int. No. 169 (Mr. Clarke); (1970) N.Y. Assy. Int. No. 6700-A
(Mr. Kelly). None of the bills was ever enacted.
270 See Note, supra note 46, at 546-47.
271 See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
272 The Better Broadcasting Council proposed the rather ingenious method of having
BROADCASTING COUNCIL,
officers of the local body elected by CATV subscribers. B=rr
supra note 186, at § 3.2(b). Though this might keep conventional types of influencepeddling out, it would more probably just result in the creation of new forms. Moreover, it might be unfair to some nonsubscribers who have a real interest in cable regulation
-e.g. prospective subscribers.
273 It is questionable how far the Commission can go in compelling a local government to take certain action. Note 263 supra. A system of ultimate Commission review
might therefore require legislation.
274 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 US. 29 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 867 (1969).
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be closely regulated because of the limited availability of frequencies. 275
This theory is increasingly untenable in broadcasting,27 6 and seems inapplicable to CATV's economy of abundance. 277 Access regulation
might possibly violate the first amendment, since it prescribes how a
cable operator may and may not program some of his channels.2 78 The
cable operator's lament, however, should be no more persuasive than
the broadcaster's, especially in light of the Court's commitment to
279
diversity.
CONCLUSION

Broadcasting's economic structure has prevented it from developing
real diversity. CATV can potentially turn this situation on its ear, but
not if left to the dictates of the marketplace or to the caprice of individual operators. Traditional modes of regulation and diversification of
ownership are likely to be no more effective with CATV than with
broadcasting. Conversely, access regulation presents enormous practical
and political problems. Nevertheless, it might just be worth a try, before
the nation wanders from the vast wasteland into something even worse.
275 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
276 As one lower federal court noted, there are currently far more radio and television stations than newspapers in any given community. Radio Television News Directors
Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1019 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
277 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969), the Court indicated that another basis for Commission regulation may be the entrenched, quasi-monopolistic position of broadcasters in a community. See also Note, supra note 241, at 1018.
278 See Note, supra note 241, at 1015-16, 1020-21.
279 Notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.

